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Abstract—False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are a common
form of Cyber-attack targetting smart grids. Detection of stealthy
FDI attacks is impossible by the current bad data detection
systems. Machine learning is one of the alternative methods
proposed to detect FDI attacks. This paper analyzes three various
supervised learning techniques, each to be used with three
different feature selection (FS) techniques. These methods are
tested on the IEEE 14-bus, 57-bus, and 118-bus systems for
evaluation of versatility. Accuracy of the classification is used
as the main evaluation method for each detection technique.
Simulation study clarify the supervised learning combined with
heuristic FS methods result in an improved performance of the
classification algorithms for FDI attack detection.
Index Terms—Artificial neural network, FDI attack, feature se-
lection, genetic algorithm, binary Cuckoo search, binary particle
swarm optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s power systems consist of a network of sensors
and generators that allow two way communication within the
system’s infrastructure. This feature allows utility companies
to distribute power more efficiently along larger areas by real
time demand side management. While this complex commu-
nication system has tremendous advantage, it is more prone
to measurement tampering and cyber-attacks. These cyber-
attacks come in various forms and are typically constructed
for the purpose of power theft or causing power outages and
disturbances. False Data Injection (FDI) is a form of cyber-
attack in which the measurements are altered in a stealthy
manner [1]. Such attacks can bypass the standard defence
mechanisms used today; and as such, machine learning, among
other methods, are proposed to detect these attacks.
FDI attacks are common form of cyber-attacks targeting
smart grids. The danger in these types of attacks stems from
their ability to bypass the standard state estimation system used
in most smart grids [2]. The inability to detect these attacks
through state estimation creates the need for other methods for
classifying these attacks. FDI detection is typically achieved
through analysis of meter measurements throughout the power
system. Various detection methods have been proposed that
rely on spatial-temporal correlation, real-time correlation, and
statistical correlation of meter measurements. [3] [4] studies
the three methods and suggests that detection of FDI attacks
based on real-time correlation is favourable to intelligent
machine learning techniques due to its ability to scale to larger
systems with low computational cost. However, appropriate
feature and parameter selection can greatly improve the com-
putational efficiency of any machine learning algorithm.
Several machine learning based approaches for detecting
FDI attacks have been proposed in literature [5] [6]. [5] com-
pared a supervised and a non-supervised approach by using
support vector machines and anomaly detection algorithms.
It concluded that both machine learning algorithms are suc-
cessful at detecting FDI attacks based on statistical deviations
in measurements. Furthermore, it concluded that the features
used in detecting these attacks are highly correlated and can be
reduced to two dimensions with Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) while retaining 0.99 of the variance. While correlation
is expected in grid measurements, such high correlation was
found in this study due to the low variation in the simulation
of data. With more thorough simulation, the complexity of
the problem increases and correlation is expected to decrease.
Furthermore, larger power systems are expected to have less
co-variance among the measurements; and as such, alternative
feature selection (FS) methods are necessary.
[7] has tested and compared more algorithms for detection
of FDI attacks. The supervised learning algorithms used in this
study are linear and Gaussian SVM, K Nearest Neighbour
(KNN), and a single-layer perceptron. The study concluded
that KNN is more sensitive to the system size and may perform
better in small size systems. It also concluded that SVM
performs better on large-scale systems, specifically with a
Gaussian kernel. Single layer perceptron was also observed to
be less sensitive to the system size, however not as accurate as
SVM. A multi-layered perceptron, also known as an artificial
neural network (ANN), is hypothesized to be more accurate
due to its increased complexity.
Similarly, [8] tested SVM, KNN, and Extended Nearest
Neighbours (ENN), and compared their accuracy on the
IEEE 30-bus system. General conclusions can be made about
the success of machine learning in classifying FDI attacks.
However, this study lacks thorough cross-validation between
algorithms of varying parameters. Furthermore, testing was
only done on one system, so no conclusions can be made on
the versatility of the classification algorithms among power
systems of varying sizes.
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In this paper, the performance of three different classifica-
tion techniques are tested with three heuristic FS techniques.
The three machine learning algorithms used are SVM, KNN
algorithm, and ANN. The three FS techniques are Binary
Cuckoo Search (BCS), Binary Particle Swarm Optimization
(BPSO), and Genetic Algorithm (GA). The goal is to combine
machine learning and FS techniques to take advantages of their
strength and compensate their weaknesses. These algorithms
will be compared based on their classification accuracy and
computational efficiency. The results show that heuristic FS
techniques are capable of selecting a subset of features that
can obtain a higher classification accuracy with a significantly
lower number of features.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. State Estimation of Power Systems
Power systems that employ smart grid technologies rely on
state estimation to predict the state of the system which deter-
mines the optimal power generation. This technique represents
a relationship between the state variables of the system and the
real measurements recorded along the power grid [9] [10]. The
measurement data consists of power flow, voltage magnitude
and phase angles described as follows:
Z(k) = H(k)x(k) + (k) (1)
where Z represents measurement vector, x represents vector
of state variables, H is the Jacobian matrix, and  is the mea-
surement error. k refers to the time step. The state estimation
problem under the assumption of global observability can be
formulated using the least squares method as follows:
xˆ(k + 1) = xˆ(k) +G−1(k)H(k)W−1[Z(k)−H(k)xˆ(k)],
(2)
where gain matrix G(k) = HT (k)W−1H(k). xˆ is the vector
of estimated states of the system. W is the covariance matrix.
To make sure about the accuracy of the estimation, measure-
ment data will be checked to remove bad data [11].Tradition-
ally, bad data is detected through following 2-norm residual
test:
‖z −Hx‖2 < ε (3)
where ε is the threshold for bad data detection. If the residual
of the measurements go above the predefined threshold bad
data exist and should be removed before the next iteration.
B. False Data Injection Attacks
FDI attacks consist of malicious data injected into the
measurement meters. FDI attacks can be performed by ma-
nipulating the measurements along the network by a linear
factor of the Jacobian matrix of the system [4] [12]. An FDI
attack can then be simulated as
Zbad = Z + a (4)
where a is an attack vector such that a = Hc which results in
‖Z −Hx‖2 = ‖Zbad −Hxbad‖2 + Γ
where Γ is an error term attributed to the state estimation that
must remain within a certain threshold depending on the power
system.
III. SUPERVISED LEARNING BASED DETECTION OF FALSE
DATA INJECTION
Three supervised classification algorithms will be cross val-
idated along with three heuristic FS techniques. The following
sections discuss the algorithms implemented in this paper.
A. Feature Selection
Power systems are highly complex and large scale physical
systems with huge number of feature and measurements.
Therefore, feature selection is an essential task that should
be performed to optimize the computational efficiency [13].
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) has been used in previ-
ous literature for dimensionality reduction [5]. However, large-
scale power systems behave somewhat non-linearly; and as
such, heuristic approaches to feature selection are considered.
In this paper, GA, Cuckoo Search (CS), and Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) are used to increase the computational
efficiency of the supervised learning algorithms. Each of the
algorithms are aimed to obtain the most optimal subset of
features that results in the best accuracy. Each solution consists
of a binary vector with each index being 1 if the feature is
used in this subset and 0 if it is not.
1) Binary Cuckoo Search: BCS is a binary implementation
of CS, an optimization algorithm based on the parasite behav-
ior of some species of Cuckoo. The CS algorithm is proposed
by [14] and summarized by the following three rules:
1) Each Cuckoo lays one egg at a randomly chosen nest.
2) The best nests with high quality eggs carry over to the
next generation.
3) The number of available nests is fixed. And if another
cuckoo egg is discovered by the host bird, the host can
remove the egg or build a new nest.
Mathematically, the nests, or solutions, are updated using
random walk via Lvy flights:
xji (t) = x
j
i (t− 1) + α⊕ Levy(λ) (5)
and
Levy ∼ u = s−λ, (1 < λ ≤ 3) (6)
where xji is the j
th egg (feature) at nest (solution) i, s is
the step size, α > 0 is the step size scaling factor, and ⊕ is
the entry-wise product. The Lvy flights employ a random step
length which is drawn from a Lvy distribution which creates
longer step length in the long run allowing more efficient
search space exploration [14]. The solutions are restricted to
binary values by the following equations:
S
(
xji (t)
)
=
1
1 + e−x
j
i (t)
(7)
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xji (t+ 1) =
{
1 if S
(
xji (t)
)
> σ
0 otherwise
(8)
in which σ ∼ U(0, 1) and xji (t) denotes the new egg value at
time t [15].
2) Genetic Algorithm: GA is an optimization technique that
yields the best solution based on the evolution mechanism of
living beings [16]. Following the principle of natural selection,
GA chooses the best solutions based on their fitness. In each
iteration, GA eliminates the solutions with the lowest fitness
and retains the solutions with the highest fitness. Similarly to
III-A1, the solution consists of a binary vector indicating the
variables used as features, and the fitness of each solution is
the classification accuracy of FDI attacks based on that subset
of features.
3) Binary Particle Swarm Optimization: PSO is an algo-
rithm used for solving a variety of problems. The algorithm is
motivated by social behaviours in nature. The main character-
istic of this algorithm is that optimization is performed through
social interaction in the population where thinking is not
only personal, but also social [17]. A binary implementation
of Particle Swarm Optimization (BPSO) is also used as a
heuristic method for feature selection.
The first step of implementing BPSO is initialization of
population consisting of user defined particles; each particle
represents a feasible solution. Through iterations, particles
update themselves by tracking two criteria. The first crite-
rion is the best solution of each particle. Personal best of
the ith particle is pBesti =
(
pBest1i , pBest
2
i , . . . , pBest
n
i
)
.
And the second criterion is global best solutions, gBest =(
gBest1, gBest2, . . . , gBestn
)
respectively.
B. Classification Algorithms
Three types of supervised learning algorithms are imple-
mented in this study for the purpose of cross-validation and
analysis. The three types of classification algorithms use
different mathematical approaches to classify the data. The
following subsections will explain each of the algorithms to
be implemented.
1) Support Vector Machine: SVM is an algorithm that
classifies data by constructing a set of hyper-planes in high di-
mensions [18]. To simplify the computations, kernel functions
are used to represent the mapping of the data. In this study,
a Gaussian kernel will be used for the SVM due to its non-
linear properties and its capability of classifying data based
on statistical variances with high computational efficiency.
Mathematically, the Gaussian kernel is defined as follows:
K (xi, xi′) = exp
−γ
p∑
j=1
(xij − xi′j)2
 (9)
where γ is the kernel coefficient. The SVM algorithm
will be tested with varying penalty parameter, C, and kernel
coefficient, γ, and cross-validated for accuracy.
2) K- Nearest Neighbours: KNN algorithm classifies data
based on its closest k neighbours. The closeness between the
data is determined using the euclidean distance,
dij = ‖si − sj‖ , sj ∈ S (10)
where S and s correspond to labelled and unlabelled data
respectively. For k > 1, data is classified based on majority of
neighbours. In this study, various k values will be tested and
cross validated for accuracy.
3) Artificial Neural Network: ANN is an algorithm com-
posed of interconnected elements, called neurons or nodes,
which process information based on specific weights. ANNs
can be constructed in various methods and architectures and
typically consist of an input layer, hidden layers, and an output
layer each consisting of several nodes. Each node i performs
calculations represented by the transfer function fi as follows:
yi = fi
 n∑
j=1
wijxj − θi
 (11)
where yi is the output of the node i, xj is the jth input to
the node, wij is the connection weight between nodes i and
j, and θi is the bias of node i.
The architecture of the ANNs implemented in this study
consist of an input layer of L nodes, one hidden layer of M
nodes, and an output layer of N nodes; where L is equal to
the number of features in the input data, N is equal to 2, the
number of classes, and M is calculated as follows:
M =
⌈
N + L
2
⌉
(12)
The ANN algorithm will be implemented with varying
learning rate, α, and using back propagation as a learning
solver.
C. Evaluation Methods
The classification algorithms implemented in this study are
evaluated based on their prediction accuracy of testing data.
The classification accuracy of each algorithm is calculated
based on the classification results of the testing data as follows:
accuracy =
number of correct predictions
number of testing data
(13)
IV. METHODOLOGY
The data used in this experiment is generated using the
IEEE 14-bus, IEEE 57-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems and
MATPOWER library [19]. The measurement data consists of
power flow of branches and buses which are mapped into
the state variables, the voltage bus angles, using the Jacobian
matrix. Based on the aforementioned process in section II-B,
10,000 instances of measurements are generated as training
data with half of them being infected with an FDI attack.
Another 1,000 instances are generated as testing data to
calculate the classification accuracy of each method.
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The experimental process consisted of two main steps.
First, the classification algorithms in section III-B are cross-
validated for accuracy along varying parameters with all
original features of each system. The goal is to obtain optimal
parameters for each algorithm to be used for the remainder of
the experiment. The second step is testing the three FS tech-
niques described in section III-A with the three classification
algorithms described in III-B using the optimal parameters
obtained in the first step.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Parameter optimization of each of the supervised learning
algorithm is performed through cross-validation of varying
parameters with optimal accuracy. Figure 1 shows the accuracy
of each of the three algorithms with varying parameters on
the IEEE 14-bus system. SVM is cross-validated for varying
kernel coefficient and penalty parameter,γ and C respectively,
KNN is cross-validated for varying number of neighbours,
K, and ANN is cross-validated for varying learning rate, α.
The data used for this cross-validation consists of all the
measurements of the system. Optimal parameters of each
learning algorithms are selected based on the maximum accu-
racy achieved on the IEEE 14-bus system with no FS. These
parameters are stated in table I.
TABLE I
OPTIMAL PARAMETERS OF THE SUPERVISED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
AND THEIR CORRESPONDING ACCURACY ON THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM
WITH NO FEATURE SELECTION
Algorithm Parameters Accuracy
SVM C = 1000, γ = 0.0001 90.93%
KNN K = 12 80.82%
ANN α = 10−6 84.50%
Fig. 1. Accuracy of SVM, ANN, and KNN for varying parameters for IEEE
14-bus system.
The three FS methods, BCS, BPSO, and GA, are imple-
mented with the parameters stated in table II which are chosen
based on [15] and [16]. The resultant subset of features se-
lected by each algorithm are tested with the three classification
algorithms, SVM, KNN, and ANN, and their classification
accuracy on each of the three IEEE bus systems are recorded
in tables III, IV, and V.
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE HEURISTIC FS ALGORITHMS
Algorithm Parameters
BCS α = 0.1, P (a) = 0.25, population = 30, iterations = 10
BPSO c1 = c2 = 2, w = 0.7, population = 30, iterations = 10
GA mutationrate = 0.018, population = 50, iterations = 30
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF EACH SUPERVISED LEARNING
ALGORITHM WITH EACH HEURISTIC FEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUE ON
THE IEEE 14-BUS SYSTEM
FS Num of Classification Accuracy
Method Features SVM KNN ANN
NO FS 34 90.79% 80.28% 81.78%
BCS 11 90.69% 81.38% 77.08%
BPSO 8 90.19% 81.68% 79.18%
GA 8 90.49% 82.28% 79.28%
TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF EACH SUPERVISED LEARNING
ALGORITHM WITH EACH HEURISTIC FEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUE ON
THE IEEE 57-BUS SYSTEM
FS Num of Classification Accuracy
Method Features SVM KNN ANN
NO FS 137 88.29% 83.08% 50.05%
BCS 94 88.59% 84.48% 50.15%
BPSO 130 87.39% 83.58% 48.25%
GA 56 87.39% 85.59% 50.95%
TABLE V
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF EACH SUPERVISED LEARNING
ALGORITHM WITH EACH HEURISTIC FEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUE ON
THE IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM
FS Num of Classification Accuracy
Method Features SVM KNN ANN
NO FS 304 84.88% 74.57% 53.05%
BCS 199 83.58% 75.48% 51.25%
BPSO 160 83.28% 76.68% 51.95%
GA 122 90.59% 78.18% 50.05%
Results show that SVM and KNN are successful at detecting
FDI attacks in all three IEEE bus systems. SVM is the most
versatile scoring the highest classification accuracy among all
the FS methods and in all three test systems. Furthermore, all
three heuristic FS methods proved successful at reducing the
number of features. GA produced the most successful results
among the three FS methods by achieving the highest classifi-
cation accuracy with minimal number of features. ANNs with
the proposed architecture were unsuccessful at detecting FDI
attacks regardless of the FS method.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The inability of the current defence mechanisms to detect
FDI attacks calls for alternative methods of detection. In
this paper, supervised learning algorithms are implemented
and proved to be successful at detecting FDI attacks when
tested on the IEEE 14-bus, 57-bus, and 118-bus systems.
Furthermore, heuristic FS methods were successful at main-
taining, and sometimes increasing, the classification accuracy
with significantly lower number of features. SVM and KNN
algorithms proved more accurate and versatile among the three
systems when compared to the ANN implemented in this
paper. However, ANNs with more complex architectures are
expected to have better performance on larger systems at a
higher computational cost.
FS methods were all successful at increasing accuracy or
reducing the number of features, and in some cases both.
Classification results conclude that GA is the most efficient
heuristic FS method for power systems in terms of accuracy
and number of features. SVM with GA proved to be the most
accurate and versatile among the three systems.
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